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In sponsored search, advertising slots are usually sold by a search engine to an advertiser through an
auction mechanism in which advertisers bid on keywords. In theory, an auction mechanism encourages the
advertisers to truthfully bid for keywords. However, keyword auctions have a number of problems including:
(i) volatility in revenue, (ii) uncertainty in the bidding and charged prices for advertisers’ keywords, and (iii)
weak brand loyalty between the advertiser and the search engine. To address these issues, we study the
possibility of creating a special option contract that alleviates these problems. In our proposal, an advertiser
purchases an option in advance from a search engine by paying an upfront fee, known as the option price.
The advertiser then has the right, but no obligation, to then purchase specific keywords for a fixed cost-
per-click (CPC) for a specified number of clicks in a specified period of time. Hence, the advertiser has
increased certainty in sponsored search while the search engine could raise the customers’ loyalty. The
proposed option contract can be used in conjunction with traditional keyword auctions. As such, the option
price and corresponding fixed CPC price must be set such that there is no arbitrage opportunity. In this
paper, we discuss an option pricing model tailored to sponsored search that deals with spot CPCs of targeted
keywords in a generalized second price (GSP) auction. We show that the pricing model for keywords is closely
related to a special exotic option in finance that contains multiple underlying assets (multi-keywords) and is
also multi-exercisable (multi-clicks). Experimental results on real advertising data verify our pricing model
and demonstrate that advertising options can benefit both advertisers and search engines.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavior Science – Eco-
nomics
General Terms: Theory, Algorithms
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Sponsored Search, Option Contract, Pricing Model
1. INTRODUCTION
Sponsored search is an important online advertising format [PWC 2013]. A search
engine sells ad slots in the search engine results pages (SERPs) generated in response
to a user query. The terms in the query are referred to as keywords and the price of
an ad slot is usually determined by a keyword auction [Bo¨rgers et al. 2008; Fain and
Pedersen 2006; Maille´ et al. 2012; Varian 2009] such as the widely used generalized
second price (GSP) auction [Edelman et al. 2007; Varian 2007]. In the GSP auction,
advertisers bid on keywords present in the query, and the highest bidder pays the
price associated with the second highest bid.
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Despite the success of the keyword auctions, there are two major drawbacks. First,
the uncertain and volatile bidding prices make it difficult for advertisers to predict
their campaign costs and thus complicate their business planning [Wang and Chen
2012]. Second, the pay-as-you-go nature of the auctions does not encourage stable rela-
tionships between search engines and advertisers [Jank and Yahav 2010]: advertisers
can switch from one search engine to another in the next bidding with near zero cost.
To alleviate these problems we propose a multi-keyword multi-click option contract.
This is a contract between an advertiser and a search engine. It consists of a non-
refundable upfront fee, known as the option price, paid by the advertiser, in return for
the right, but not the obligation, to subsequently purchase a fixed number of clicks for
particular keywords for a specified fixed CPC during a specified period of time. The
fact that the contract covers a specific period of time should encourage a more stable
relationship between the advertiser and the search engine. From the advertiser’s per-
spective, fixing the CPC significantly reduces the uncertainty in cost of an advertising
campaign. Moreover, if the CPC price set by the auction falls below the fixed CPC price,
the advertiser is not obligated to exercise the option, but can, instead, participate in
the auction. Thus, the option can be considered as establishing an upper limit on the
cost of the campaign. From the search engine’s perspective, the option is an additional
service that acts as an insurance policy for advertisers. We show that the search engine
can, in fact, increase their ad revenue by the option price.
Our proposed option differs from a standard option in two respects. First, the op-
tion can be exercised not once, but multiple times during the contract period. Second,
the option is not for a single asset (i.e. keyword), but a basket of assets. Both types
of exotic options have been studied within the economics community and the novelty
of this work and the comparisons with the related work are discussed in Section 2.
The primary question for us is how to determine the option price and the associated
fixed CPC associated with each keyword in the advertiser’s list. Clearly if the option is
priced too low, then significant loss in revenue may ensure. Moreover, this may create
an arbitrage opportunity where the buyer of the option sells their advertising slots
at a risk-less profit. Conversely, if the fixed CPC prices are too high, then the adver-
tiser will either not purchase the option or not exercise their right to purchase ad
slots at the agreed fixed price. This paper has the following contributions. We propose
a new mechanism for selling future keywords in sponsored search, which it can be
implemented in conjunction with keyword auctions. We show that in the broader en-
vironment, advertisers can easily adjust their advertising strategies by interacting an
option contract with keyword auctions. We then illustrate how the proposed ad option
can be effectively priced so that arbitrage between the spot (auction) market and the
option market are eliminated. Finally, we show that ad option can serve as an insur-
ance service, and provide an additional revenue stream for a search engine.
2. RELATED WORK
We first review the prior work on options, and then discuss the related work in online
advertising.
2.1. Options and Their Pricing
A standard option is a contract in which the seller grants the buyer the right, but not
the obligation, to enter into a transaction with the seller to either buy or sell an under-
lying asset at a fixed price on or before a fixed date. The fixed price is called strike price
and the fixed date is called expiration date. The seller grants this right in exchange for
a certain amount of money, called option price. An option is called a call option or a put
option depending on whether the buyer is purchasing a right to buy or sell the asset.
The simplest option is the European option [Hull 2009], which can be exercised only
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on the expiration date. This differs from an American option [Hull 2009], which can
be exercised at any time during the contract period. Both European and American op-
tions are standard options. In the beginning of the 1980’s, the standard options became
better understood and their trading volume exploded; financial institutions began to
search for alternative forms of options, known as exotic options [Zhang 1998], to meet
their particular business needs. Among them, two types of options, multi-asset options
and multi-exercise options, are particularly relevant to this paper.
Multi-asset options are options with payoffs affected by at least two underlying in-
struments [Zhang 1998]. These instruments can be assets such as stocks, bonds, cur-
rencies, and indices such as the S&P-100 or FTSE-100. There are two types of multi-
asset options that can be employed and extended for sponsored search. First, the basket
call option, whose the payoff is affected by the weighted sum of the prices of a basket
of instruments. The structure of a basket call option [Wilmott 2006] can be used to
describe the setting of keyword broad match, where the weights are interpreted as
the probabilities that sub-phrases occur as queries. Second, the dual-strike call option
has two strike prices written on two underlying instruments [Zhang 1998]. The dual-
strike option provides a framework for a multi-keyword option; the advertiser is able
to switch target keywords during the contract lifetime, but in online advertising, the
number of candidate keywords for advertisers to choose from is usually more than 2.
We extend the dual cases [Zhang 1998] to higher-dimensional cases and proposes to
use Monte Carlo simulation to provide a tractable solution.
Multi-exercise options are a generalization of American options that provide the
buyer more than one exercise right and sometimes control over one or more other
variables, e.g. the amount of the underlying instrument exercised at a certain time.
Multi-exercise options have become more prevalent over the past decade especially in
the energy industry [Villinski 2004; Marshall et al. 2011; Marshall 2012]. Our pro-
posed option contract is also a simple case of multi-exercise options because it permits
the option buyer to repeatedly exercise the right to obtain clicks on targeted keywords.
However, for sponsored search, the multi-exercise opportunity is more flexible, com-
pared to the energy industry. We allow advertisers to (i) exercise options at any time in
the option lifetime, i.e. the exercise time is not pre-specified, and (ii) no minimum num-
ber of clicks is required for each exercise, i.e. there is no penalty fee if the advertiser
does not exercise the minimum clicks. Also, there is no transaction fee in sponsored
search. Thus in this paper, the value of an m-click option is the sum of m independent
and identical (i.i.d.) single-click options.
A key issue for an option contract is how to price it. In fact, option pricing mod-
els constitute one of the most import building blocks of asset pricing theory. In 1900,
Bachelier [Bachelier 1900] first proposed to use a continuous-time random walk pro-
cess to price option contracts. Sixty five years later, Samuelson [Samuelson 1965b]
replaced Bachelier’s assumption on the asset price with a geometric form, called geo-
metric Brownian motion (GBM), thereby solving the problem of a negative asset price
in option pricing. The research of Samuelson highly affected Black and Scholes [Black
and Scholes 1973] and Merton [Merton 1973], who then studied risk-neutral pricing
for European options. The Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) option pricing formula spurred
research in this area. Our pricing model and its derivations are based on the above de-
velopment in finance and its suitability is discussed in the experiment using real data
sets.
2.2. Related Work in Online Advertising
Meinl and Blau introduced financial derivatives (including options) into web services,
but did not formally discuss their application to online advertising [Meinl and Blau
2009]. To the best of our knowledge, Moon and Kwon in [Moon and Kwon 2010] first
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proposed a hybrid option contract for online advertising. Although it is called an option,
it in fact deals with a different problem than ours. It is the option between choosing two
payment methods: the cost-per-mille (CPM, CPM is calculated based on the number
of advertisements displayed, i.e. cost per thousand of displayed ads) and CPC (cost-
per-click). The option buyer is guaranteed the right to choose the minimum payment
between CPM and the CPC after the click-through rate (CTR is the ratio of the number
of advertisements clicked on to the number of advertisements displayed) is realized.
This option contract is similar to an option paying the worst and cash [Zhang 1998],
where the option payoff depends on the minimum of the two underlying assets. The
option price proposed by Moon and Kwon is determined by a negotiation between the
advertiser and the publisher under the framework of a Nash bargaining game. There
are two utility functions: one is for the advertiser and another is for the publisher.
The objective function is to maximize the product of the two utility functions with
corresponding negotiation powers. Thus, the final option price is the optimal solution
maximizing the negotiated join utility but does not rule out arbitrage opportunity.
Wang and Chen [Wang and Chen 2012] studied an option structure for a different
problem, capping the CPM price in advance. They discussed a general pricing frame-
work based on the one-step binomial tree [Cox et al. 1979]. They showed that the cal-
culated option price can help the ad service provider manage revenue volatility over
a certain period of time. The proposed option contract only corresponds to a single
ad exposure, i.e. single click or impression, and the more realistic situation of fixing
multiple keywords with multiple clicks is not covered.
This paper develops an option contract tailored to the unique environment of spon-
sored search, where the keyword broad match, the switch between multiple keywords,
and exercising multiple clicks are considered. Our work is therefore significantly differ-
ent to the earlier studies. It is also worth mentioning that our proposed option contract
is more flexible than the guarantee contracts studied in online advertising [Salomatin
et al. 2012] as in our proposed option, the advertisers need not exercise their rights
should the prices go down in the keyword auction. The proposed scheme in [Salomatin
et al. 2012] enables an advertiser to send the click demand and ad budget in his/her
request to a search engine. It is the search engine, not the advertiser, who will decide
the guaranteed ad delivery service according to the query and position. As such the
advertiser has less control of the ad exposure time and position.
3. MULTI-KEYWORD MULTI-CLICK AD OPTION CONTRACT
In this section, we first explain how our multi-keyword, multi-click ad option works.
We then introduce a pricing model to price the ad option such that there is no arbitrage.
To illustrate our idea, consider the following example. Suppose that a Computer
Science department creates a new M.Sc. on “Web Science and Big Data Analytics” and
is interested in an advertising campaign based around relevant search terms such
as ‘MSc Web Science’, ‘MSc Big Data Analytics’, ‘Data Mining’, etc. The campaign is
to start immediately and last for three months and the goal is to generate at least
1000 clicks on the ad which directs users to the M.Sc.’s homepage. The department
(i.e., advertiser) does not know how the clicks will be distributed among the keywords,
nor how much the campaign will cost if based on keyword auctions. However, with ad
option, the advertiser can submit a request to the search engine to lock-in the ad cost.
The request consists of the candidate keywords, the overall number of clicks needed,
and the duration of the contract. The search engine responds with a price table for
the option contract, as shown in Figure 1. It contains the option price and the fixed
CPC for each keyword (with its sub-phrases for the board match case). The CPCs are
fixed yet different across the candidate keywords. The contract is entered into when
the advertiser pays the option price.
† This manuscript is under submission to a journal.
Multi-Keyword Multi-Click Option Contracts for Sponsored Search Advertising :5
Advertiser Search engine 
Sell requested ad keywords via a multi-keyword multi-click option 
Pay $50 upfront option price to buy a multi-keyword multi-click 
option. The contract can be exercised 1000 times for total 1000 
clicks on the targeted ad keywords in [0, T]. t = 0 
t = T 
Multi-keyword multi-click option  
(3 month term, max 1000 clicks) 
Option price Ad keywords Fixed CPCs 
$50 
‘MSc Web Science’ $1.80 
‘MSc Big Data Analytics’ $6.25 
‘Data Mining’ $8.67 
Exercise 100 clicks of the keyword ‘MSc Web Science’ via option. 
  
t = t1 
Reserve an ad slot of  the keyword MSc Web Science’ for the 
advertiser for 100 clicks until all the 100 clicks are fully clicked by 
Internet users.. 
Pay $1.80 to the search engine for each click until the requested 
100 clicks are fully clicked by Internet users.  
  
t = t1
c 
Timeline 
If the advertiser thinks the fixed CPC $8.67 of the keyword ‘Data 
Mining’ is expensive (i.e., higher than the what the winning bidder 
pays in keyword auctions),  he/she can attend keyword auctions to 
bid for the keyword as other bidders, say $8. 
 
Select the winning bidder for the keyword ‘Data Mining’ according 
to the GSP-based auction model.  
Lose /win the bid. If the advertiser wins the bid, he/she obtains an 
ad slot and pays the GSP-based CPC when the ad is clicked by 
Internet users. 
  
… 
Exercise 5 clicks of the keyword ‘Data Mining’ via option.  
  
t = t2 
Reserve an ad slot of  the keyword ‘Data Mining’ for the advertiser 
for 5 clicks until all the 5 clicks are fully clicked by Internet users. 
Pay $8.67 to the search engine for each click until the requested 5 
clicks are fully clicked by Internet users.  
  
t = t2
c 
Submit a request of guaranteed ad delivery for the keywords ‘MSc 
Web Science’, ‘MSc Big Data Analytics’ and ‘Data Mining’ for 
the future 3 month term  [0, T], where T = 0.25. 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 1. A schematic view of buying, selling and using a multi-keyword, multi-click ad option contract.
During the contract period [0, T ], where T represents the contract expiration date
(in terms of year format and is three months in our example), the advertiser has the
right, at any time, to exercise portions of the contract, for example, to buy a requested
number of clicks for a specific keyword. This right expires after time T or when the total
number of clicks have been purchased, whichever is sooner. For example, at time t1 ≤ T
the advertiser may exercise the right for 100 clicks on the keyword ‘MSc Web Science’.
After receiving the exercise request, the search engine immediately reserves ad slots
for the keyword for the advertiser until the ad is clicked by 100 times. In our current
design, the search engine decides which rank position the ad should be displayed as
long as the required number of clicks is fulfilled - we assume there are adequate search
impressions within the period. It is also possible to define a rank specific option where
all the parameters (CPCs, option prices etc.) become rank specific.
The advertiser can switch among the candidate keywords and also monitor the key-
word auction market for the candidate keywords. If, for example, the CPC for the key-
word “MSc Web Science” drops below the fixed CPC, then the advertiser may choose
to participate in the auction rather than exercise the option for the keyword. If later
in the campaign, the spot price for the keyword ‘MSc Web Science‘’ exceeds the fixed
CPC, the advertiser can then exercise the option.
The above example illustrates the flexibility of the proposed ad option. Specifically,
(i) the advertiser does not have to use the option and can participate in keyword auc-
tions as well, (ii) the advertiser can exercise the option at any time during the contract
period, (iii) the advertiser can exercise the option up to the maximum number of clicks,
(iv) the advertiser can request any number of clicks in each exercise provided the ac-
cumulated number of exercised clicks does not exceed the maximum number, and (v)
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the advertiser can switch between keywords at each exercise with no additional cost.
Of course, this flexibility complicates the pricing of the option, which is discussed next.
3.1. Ad Option Pricing
The proposed ad options are more flexible than the conventional impression-
guaranteed1 contracts. The ad options enable advertisers to fix their ad campaign costs
beforehand, yet leaves the decision of selecting suitable keywords and the exact tim-
ing to place the ad to later. Because of the extra flexibility, there is an intrinsic value
associated with an ad option, and advertisers are required to pay an upfront fee to buy
an ad option.
We denote the value of an n-keyword m-click ad option contract at time t as a func-
tion V (t,C(t);T,F ,m), where T is the contract exercisable period (or lifetime), m is the
number of allowed clicks specified in the contract, and F = {F1, · · · , Fn} are the agreed
fixed CPCs of the n candidate keywords. It is worth noting that the advertiser does not
need to decide on what specific keyword (asset) will be used in advance. Instead, the ad
option contract specifies a set of candidate keywords (potentially unlimited in a prede-
fined domain) and their fixed prices. During the campaign, the advertiser can decide
which keywords they intend to purchase and freely switch among them on the basis of
their business needs. The value of an ad option also changes over time and depends on
the current time t and the candidate keyword prices in the existing keyword auction
market C(t).
We adopt a widely used stochastic process [Samuelson 1965a] to model C(t) by as-
suming that the GSP-based CPC of a keyword satisfies a multivariate log-normal dis-
tribution. Specifically, keyword Ki’s CPC movement can be modeled as a multivariate
Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) as follows
dCi(t) = µiCi(t)dt+ σiCi(t)dWi(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where µi and σi are the drift and volatility of the CPC respectively, and Wi(t) is a
standard Brownian motion satisfying the conditions:
E(dWi(t)) = 0, (2)
var(dWi(t)) = E(dWi(t)dWi(t)) = dt, (3)
cov(dWi(t), dWj(t)) = E(dWi(t)dWj(t)) = ρijdt, (4)
where ρij is the correlation coefficient between the ith and jth keywords, such that
ρii = 1 and ρij = ρji. The correlation matrix is denoted by Σ, so that the covariance
matrix is simplyMΣM , whereM is the matrix with the σi along the diagonal and ze-
ros everywhere else. For a detailed explanation of such stochastic settings, see [Bjo¨rk
2009; Wilmott 2006]. Later in Section 4, we discuss GBM parameter estimation, its fit-
ness and robustness within our settings. The limitations of GBM model are discussed
in Section 5.
We need to determine how much an advertiser should pay the search engine in order
to obtain an ad option for a set of requested candidate keywords. In other words, we
need to know the initial value of V when time t = 0. This is discussed next.
3.1.1. Proposed Pricing Model. To determine the option price, we first note that the
value of a m-click ad option is equal to m number of 1-click ad option; that is
V (t,C(t);T,F ,m) = mV (t,C(t);T,F , 1). (5)
This is because, by definition, advertisers who own a proposed m-click option have
the freedom of exercising the m clicks separately and independently within the period.
1Here, the term “guaranteed” means something happening with probability 1.
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Thus, there is no difference between an m-click ad option and a set of m 1-click ad
options in terms of exercise right and restriction. Their values are the same. In our
proposed scheme, we allow the m-click ad option to be exercised up to m number of
times over the lifetime of the contract.
Second, when t = T we have
V (T,C(T );T,F ,m) = mmax{C1(T )− F1, . . . , Cn(T )− Fn, 0}. (6)
That is, at the end of the option period, T , the value of the option is determined by
the maximum difference between the spot CPC and the fixed CPC of the candidate
keywords. This is due to the fact that the optimal decision of the advertiser is to ex-
ercise the option to buy the keyword which has the maximun difference between its
market value and the value specified by the option. Thus, Eq. (6) can also be considered
as the payoff of the ad option at time T .
The proposed multi-keyword multi-click ad option complements the existing key-
word auctions and provides a risk management tool for advertisers. Thus, it is vitally
important that the ad option value V (t,C(t);T,F ,m) should not generate any arbi-
trage opportunity [Varian 1987] between the two markets. We must therefore price
the ad option such that no one is be able to make profits by taking the price differences
between the two markets without taking any risk.
The No-Arbitrage Principle has been widely used to price financial option mod-
els [Bjo¨rk 2009; Wilmott 2006]. We now show how the principle can be applied in
our case. Suppose that an arbitrager (a person who hopes to make guaranteed prof-
its from the difference between the keyword auction market and the option market)
borrows some money from a bank with a fixed interest rate r and uses the borrowed
money to buy the proposed multi-keyword multi-click ad option from a search engine.
The arbitrager then immediately decomposes the m clicks and sells some clicks of the
candidate keywords to other advertisers on the keyword auction market. The revenue
is
R(t) = V (t,C(t);F , T,m)−
n∑
i=1
ψi(t)Ci(t), (7)
where ψi(t) represents the number of the clicks for the keywordCi sold on the spot mar-
ket, and
∑
i ψi(t) = m. Before rigorously modelling the scenario, we slightly simplify
the above description. As shown in Eq. (5) we consider the value of a multi-keyword
m-click option as the sum of m multi-keyword single-click options. For mathematical
convenience, we assume the clicks can be infinitely divisible. Using Eq. (5) gives
R(t) = m
(
V (t,C(t);F , T, 1)−
n∑
i=1
∆i × Ci(t)
)
, (8)
where ∆i is the portion of the clicks going for the keyword Ci at time t and
∑
i ∆i = 1.
The changes of R(t) over a short time dt is then given
dR(t) = m
(∂V
∂t
dt+
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
σiσjρijCiCj
∂2V
∂Ci∂Cj
dt+
n∑
i=1
∂V
∂Ci
dCi −
n∑
i=1
∆idCi
)
. (9)
The above equation shows that the change of the revenue (when investing in the
price differences in the two markets) depends on time and is related to the uncertain-
ties of the candidate keywords CPCs in the auction market. If we, however, choose
∆i = ∂V/∂Ci, we in fact eliminate the uncertainties in dR(t) (i.e., the parts which have
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Brownian motions disappear), i.e.,
dR(t) = m
(
∂V
∂t
+
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
σiσjρijCiCj
∂2V
∂Ci∂Cj
)
dt. (10)
This is called delta hedging in financial option pricing [Black and Scholes 1973; Mer-
ton 1973]. Under these conditions, revenue growth is deterministic and there is no risk.
Of course, if we put the same amount money in a bank, it grows with interest r. That
is
dR(t) = rR(t)dt = rm
(
V −
n∑
i=1
Ci
∂V
∂Ci
)
dt, (11)
where we replaced R(t) using Eq. (8) and replaced ∆i with ∂V/∂Ci. If at each time, the
arbitrager adjusts the portion of clicks to each keyword in order to make revenue R(t)
so that the uncertainties of the candidate keywords’ CPCs in the auction market is
eliminated, i.e. chooses ∆i = ∂V/∂Ci, he/she can obtain the guaranteed revenue with
zero variance. In such a case, the revenue growth should equal the bank’s interest rate
- otherwise there is an arbitrage. This gives a parabolic partial differential equation
(PDE) for the no-arbitrage equilibrium as
∂V
∂t
+ r
n∑
i=1
Ci
∂V
∂Ci
+
1
2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
σiσjρijCiCj
∂2V
∂Ci∂Cj
− rV = 0. (12)
where Eq. (12) satisfies the boundary condition specified in Eq. (6). For simplicity, we
denote the boundary condition as follows
V (T,C(T );T,F , 1) = Φ(C(T )). (13)
Applying the Multidimensional Feynman-Kac˘ Stochastic Representation [Bjo¨rk
2009] to Eq. (12) gives the solution
V (t,C(t);F , T, 1) = e−r(T−t)EQt [Φ(C(T ))], (14)
where EQt [·] is the conditional expectation with respect to time t under the risk-neutral
probability Q [Bjo¨rk 2009]. Under this, the process Ci(t) is rewritten as
dCi(t) = rCi(t)dt+ σiCi(t)dW
Q
i (t), (15)
where WQi (t) is the Q-Brownian motion under the risk-neutral probability Q. Finally,
the option price pi is given as
pi = mV (0,C(0);F , T, 1)
= me−rTEQ0 [Φ(C(T ))]
= me−rT
(
2piT
)−n/2|Σ|−1/2( n∏
i=1
σi
)−1
×
∫ ∞
0
· · ·
∫ ∞
0
Φ(C˜)∏n
i=1 C˜i
exp
{
−1
2
ζTΣ−1ζ
}
dC˜, (16)
where ζi = 1σi
√
T
[ln{C˜i/Ci(0)} − (r − σ
2
i
2 )T ]. Next, we discuss the solution of Eq. (16)
under various situations.
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3.1.2. Solutions and Discussion. If we only have one candidate keyword, n = 1, Eq. (16)
is actually equivalent to the Black-Scholes-Merton pricing formula for an European
call option [Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 1973]; that is,
pi = mC(0)N [ζ1]−mFe−rTN [ζ2], (17)
where the notationN [·] represents the cumulative probability distribution function of
a standard normal distribution, where
ζ1 =
1
σ
√
T
[
ln{C(0)/F}+ (r + σ
2
2
)T
]
, (18)
ζ2 = ζ1 − σ
√
T . (19)
If we have two candidate keywords, n = 2, Eq. (16) contains a bivariate normal
distribution; pi can be obtained by employing the pricing formula for an European dual-
strike call option [Zhang 1998] as follows
pi = mC1(0)φ1 +mC2(0)φ2 −me−rT (F1φ3 + F2φ4), (20)
where
φ1 =
∫ ζ1+σ1√T
−∞
f(u)N
[
q1(u+ σ1
√
T )− ρσ1
√
T + ρu√
1− ρ2
]
du, (21)
φ2 =
∫ ζ2+σ2√T
−∞
f(v)N
[
q2(u+ σ2
√
T )− ρσ1
√
T + ρv√
1− ρ2
]
dv, (22)
φ3 =
∫ ζ1
−∞
f(u)N
[
q1(u) + ρu√
1− ρ2
]
du, (23)
φ4 =
∫ ζ2
−∞
f(v)N
[
q2(v) + ρv√
1− ρ2
]
dv, (24)
q1(u) =
1
σ2
√
T
[
ln
{
F2 − F1 + C1(0)e(r− 12σ21)T−uσ1
√
T
C2(0)
}]
− 1
σ2
√
T
[
(r − 1
2
σ22)T
]
, (25)
q2(u) =
1
σ1
√
T
[
ln
{
F1 − F2 + C2(0)e(r− 12σ22)T−vσ2
√
T
C1(0)
}]
− 1
σ1
√
T
[
(r − 1
2
σ21)T
]
, (26)
ζ1 =
1
σ1
√
T
[
ln{C1(0)/F1}+ (r − 1
2
σ21)T
]
, (27)
ζ2 =
1
σ2
√
T
[
ln{C2(0)/F2}+ (r − 1
2
σ22)T
]
. (28)
Unfortunately, in most our cases, we have more than two candidate keywords
(n ≥ 3), and taking integrals in Eq. (16) is computationally difficult. Thus, we resort
to a Monte Carlo method rather than a closed-form solution. The detailed computa-
tions are shown in Algorithm 1. The solution generates n˜ possible price paths for each
targeted keyword over the time T horizon (i.e., each path contains 365×T discrete val-
ues). Notice that the generated price paths are correlated under a given risk-neutral
† This manuscript is under submission to a journal.
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ALGORITHM 1: Calculating an n-keyword m-click ad option price pi by using Monte
Carlo method.
Input:
K = [K1, . . . ,Kn]; # the targeted keywords in an option
C(0) = [C1(0), . . . , Cn(0)]; # the current CPCs of targeted keywords
Σ; # the correlation matrix of change rates of historical CPCs
σi, i = 1, . . . , n; # the volatility of historical change rates of CPCs
m; # the maximum number of clicks
T ; # the option expiration date (in terms of year, i.e., 365 days)
r; # the constant risk-less bank interest rate
n˜; # the number of simulations
// STEP I: Generate CPCs of keywords under a multivariate GBM
for k = 1 to n˜ do
[z1,k, . . . , zn,k]
′ ∼MVN(0,Σ);
for i = 1 to n do
for j = 1 to T × 365 do
Ci,k,j ← Ci(0) exp
{
(r − 1
2
σ2i )
j
365
+ σizi,k
√
j
365
}
. (29)
// STEP II: Calculate the option price by approximation
for k = 1 to n˜ do
Gk ← Φ([C1,k,T×365, . . . , Cn,k,T×365]);
pi ← me−rTEQ0
[
Φ(C(T ))
] ≈ me−rT( 1
n˜
n˜∑
k=1
Gk
)
. (30)
Output:
pi; # the option price
multivariate GBM. As there are n candidate keywords in an option, we have a cube
n×n˜×(365×T ) of generated price data, denoted by Ci,k,j , where i = 1, . . . , n, k = 1, . . . , n˜
and j = 1, . . . , 365 × T . Then, the option values at time T are calculated and their
time-discounted mean value to time t = 0 is the option price. The estimation of the
parameters and their impact will be discussed in the experiment section later.
3.2. Effects on Search Engine’s Revenue
One way of thinking of the ad option is to consider it as an insurance for advertisers.
They pay an insurance premium (i.e., upfront option price) and obtain the right to
purchase keywords with fixed CPCs in the future. Thus, the ad option caps ad costs
even if the spot CPCs go up in auction markets. Since this insurance does not come
without a cost (i.e., the option price), the ad option is also beneficial to the search
engine’s revenue.
Let us separately analyze the revenues of a search engine from selling keywords in
auctions and via an ad option. Suppose there are n candidate keywords (and each is
with a single click) to sell. If the search engine sells the keywords in auctions, his/her
total revenue Ra(T ) at time T is
∑n
i=1 Ci(T ). If the search engine sells these n candi-
date keywords via an ad option, his/her total revenue would be
Ro(T ) =
{
pierT , p0,
pierT + Fi +
∑n
j 6=i Cj(T ), pi, i = 1, . . . , n.
(31)
† This manuscript is under submission to a journal.
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where Fi denotes the agreed fixed CPC for keyword i. The notation p0 represents
the probability that the ad option is not exercised while the pi is the probability
that the ad option is exercised for the keyword Ki for the given spot CPCs C(T ) =
{C1(T ), . . . , Cn(T )}. Hence, the expected difference between these two revenues is
EQt [Ro(T )−Ra(T )] = pierT −
n∑
i=1
(EQt [Ci(T )]− Fi)p˜i, (32)
where p˜i is the probability that the advertiser exercises the option through the key-
word Ki for the given expected spot CPCs EQt [C(T )] = {EQt [C1(T )], . . . ,EQt [Cn(T )]}.
Eq. (32) can be evaluated numerically as EQt [Ci(T )] and p˜i are able to be calculated
based on simulated paths.
To simplify our discussion, we consider a single keyword, i.e. n = 1. If we let D(F ) =
EQt [Ro(T )−Ra(T )], denote the difference in revenue, then Eq. (32) can be rewritten as
D(F ) = C(0)erTN [ζ1]− FN [ζ2]
− (EQt [C(T )]− F )× P(EQt [C(T )] ≥ F ). (33)
We now first discuss the boundary values. First, if F = 0, the option price achieves
its maximum e−rTEQt [C(T )], so D(F )→ 0. Second, if pi = 0, the fixed CPC F is as large
as possible, and the probability P(EQt [C(T )] ≥ F ) → 0 and D(F ) → 0. Let us take a
closer look at P(EQt [C(T )] >= F ). We have
P(EQt [C(T )] ≥ F ) = P(C(0) exp{(r −
1
2
σ2)T} ≥ F )
= P(ln{F/C(0)} − (r − 1
2
σ2)T ≤ 0)
= P(ln{C(T )/C(0)} − (r − 1
2
σ2)T
≤ ln{C(0)/F}+ (r − 1
2
σ2)T + σW (T ))
≈ N
[
1
σ
√
T
[ln{C(0)/F}+ (r − 1
2
σ2)T ]
]
= N [ζ2]. (34)
Substituting Eq. (34) into Eq. (33) gives
D(F ) = C(0)erTN [ζ1]− EQt (C(T ))N [ζ2]
≥ C(0)erTN [ζ1]− C(0)e(r− 12σ2)TN [ζ1] > 0, (35)
which shows that D(F ) is always larger than zero, suggesting that the search engine
will increase their revenue if selling a click as an option rather than through auction.
We next take the derivative of D(F ) with respect to the agreed fixed CPC F and assign
its value to zero:
∂D(F )
∂F
= C(0)erT
∂N [ζ1]
∂ζ1
∂ζ1
∂F
−N [ζ2]− F ∂N [ζ2]
∂ζ2
∂ζ2
∂F
− (EQt [C(T )]− F )
∂P(EQt [C(T )] ≥ F )
∂F
+ P(EQt [C(T )] ≥ F ) = 0. (36)
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Table I. Overview of experimental settings of data.
Market Group Training set (31 days) Deve&test set (31 days)
US
1 25/01/2012-24/02/2012 24/02/2012-25/03/2012
2 30/03/2012-29/04/2012 29/04/2012-31/05/2012
3 10/06/2012-12/07/2012 12/07/2012-17/08/2012
4 10/11/2012-11/12/2012 11/12/2012-10/01/2013
UK
1 25/01/2012-24/02/2012 24/02/2012-25/03/2012
2 30/03/2012-29/04/2012 29/04/2012-31/05/2012
3 12/06/2012-13/07/2012 13/07/2012-19/08/2012
4 18/10/2012-22/11/2012 22/11/2012-24/12/2012
Since ∂N (x)/∂x = 1√
2pi
e−
1
2x
2
, the following equation holds
∂N [ζ2]
∂ζ2
/
∂N [ζ1]
∂ζ1
= exp
{
1
2
(ζ21 − ζ22 )
}
=
C(0)erT
F
. (37)
Taking the derivative of ζ1 and ζ2 with respect to F gives
∂ζ1
∂F
=
∂ 1
σ
√
T
[
ln{C(0)/F}+ (r + 12σ2)T
]
∂F
= − 1
Fσ
√
T
, (38)
∂ζ2
∂F
=
∂ζ1
∂F
− ∂σ
√
T
∂F
= − 1
Fσ
√
T
. (39)
Substituting Eqs (34), (37), (38) and (39) into Eq. (36) shows that D(F ) achieves its
maximum or minimum value if F = EQt [C(T )]. Further, taking the second derivative of
D(F ) at the point F = EQt [C(T )] gives
∂2D(F )
∂F 2
=
∂P(EQt [C(T )] ≥ F )
∂F
=
∂N [ζ2]
∂ζ2
∂ζ2
∂F
= − 1√
2pi
e−
1
2 ζ2
2 1
Fσ
√
T
< 0, (40)
which shows that D(F ) has a maximum value when the fixed price F = EQt [C(T )].
Thus, if the search engine sets the agreed fixed CPC, F = EQt [C(T )], then the difference
in revenue between the option and auction is maximized. In Section 4.4, we experimen-
tally examine the revenue differences between the keyword option and auction under
various settings.
4. EXPERIMENTS
We first examine if the proposed ad option can be fairly priced with real sponsored
search data. We then investigate the effects of the option on a search engine’s revenue.
4.1. Data and Experimental Design
Our data2 are collected from Google AdWords [Google 2013] by using its Traffic Esti-
mation service. When an advertiser submits his/her ad keywords, budget, and other
settings (e.g., keyword match type and targeted ad location), the service will return a
list of sponsored search daily data, including estimated CPC, clicks, global and local
impressions and position. This information is recorded for the period from 26/11/2011
2The raw data is available at:
http://www.computational-advertising.org [Yuan and Wang 2012].
† This manuscript is under submission to a journal.
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Fig. 2. Empirical example of generating sample paths under GBM for a 3-keyword single-click option and
calculating corresponding payoffs.
to 14/01/2013, for a total of 557 keywords across US and UK markets (in which 21
keywords have missing data and 115 keywords all have zero CPCs).
The data of each market is split into 4 experimental groups and each group has one
training, one development, and one test set, as illustrated in Table I. The training set is
used to: (i) select the keywords with non-zero CPCs; (ii) test the statistical properties of
the underlying dynamic and estimate the model parameters. We then price ad options
and simulate the buying and selling transactions in the development set. Finally, the
test set is used as the baseline to examine the developed option pricing models.
4.2. Parameter Estimation and Option Pricing
To estimate the GBM parameters, we use the method suggested by Wilmott (Sec.
11.3) [Wilmott 2006]. For the ad keyword Ki, the volatility σi is the sample standard
deviation of change rates of log CPCs and the correlation is
ρij =
∑m˜
k=1
(
yi(k)− y¯i
)(
yj(k)− y¯j
)√∑m˜
k=1
(
yi(k)− y¯i
)2∑m˜
k=1
(
yj(k)− y¯j
)2 , (41)
where m˜ is the size of the training data and yi(tk) is the kth change rate of log CPCs.
Figure 2 illustrates an empirical example of the keywords ‘canon cameras’, ‘nikon cam-
era’ and ‘yahoo web hosting’, where the parameters are estimated as follows
σ =
(
0.2263
0.4521
0.2136
)
, Σ =
(
1.0000 0.2341 0.0242
0.2341 1.0000 −0.0540
0.0242 −0.0540 1.0000
)
.
A high contextual relevance of ad keywords normally means that they have a high
substitutional degree to each other, such as ‘canon cameras’ and ‘nikon camera’, whose
CPCs move in the same direction with correlation 0.2341. The other keyword ‘yahoo
web hosting’ is contextually less relevant to the formers and also has very low price
correlations to them. This example shows that the contextual relevance of ad keywords
† This manuscript is under submission to a journal.
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Table II. Testing arbitrage of options under the GBM: n is the number of
keywords, N is the number of options priced in a group, P(α) is % of op-
tions in a group identified arbitrage, and the E[α] is the average arbitrage
value of the options identified arbitrage, where the arbitrage α is defined
by Eq. (44).
n Group US market UK market
N P(α) E[α] N P(α) E[α]
1
1 94 0.00% 0.00% 76 0.00% 0.00%
2 64 0.00% 0.00% 45 0.00% 0.00%
3 94 1.06% 0.75% 87 0.00% 0.00%
4 112 0.89% -0.37% 53 0.00% 0.00%
2
1 47 4.26% 1.63% 38 0.00% 0.00%
2 32 9.38% 0.42% 22 4.55% 13.41%
3 47 4.26% 0.84% 43 4.65% 0.82%
4 56 5.36% 3.44% 26 23.08% -6.22%
3
1 31 0.00% 0.00% 25 4.00% 0.00%
2 21 4.76% -1.38% 15 0.00% 0.00%
3 31 0.00% 0.00% 29 3.45% -1.12%
4 37 10.81% 3.87% 17 35.29% -2.54%
has an impact on the keywords CPCs movement. Based on the estimated parameters,
we draw a sample of simulated paths of 3-dimensional GBM in Figure 2(a) for 31
days (where the x-axis is expressed in terms of year value). Recall that the option
payoff at any time t in the contract lifetime is max{C1(t) − F1, . . . , Cn(t) − Fn, 0}. In
Figure 2(b), we plot the price difference between the spot CPC and the fixed CPC of
each targeted keyword (i.e., Ci(t)−Fi, i = 1, . . . , n) and also indicate the corresponding
option daily payoffs (shown by the cyan curve) where F1 = 3.8505, F2 = 4.6704 and F3 =
6.2520. Figure 2(b) suggests that switching between keywords would help advertisers
maximise the benefits of an ad option. Repeating the above simulations 100 times
generates 100 simulated vales of each keyword for each day, and their daily mean
values are calculated. We also calculate 100 option payoffs and calculate their daily
mean values to obtain the final option price according to Algorithm 1.
To examine the fairness, i.e. no-arbitrage, of the calculated option price, we construct
a risk-less advertising strategy by delta hedging ∂V/∂Cj and check if any arbitrage
exists. Since a single-keyword single-click option can be priced by the Black-Scholes-
Merton European option model [Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 1973] (see Eq. (17)),
the hedging delta is
∆ =
∂V
∂C
= N
[
1
σ
√
T
(
ln
{
C(0)
F
}
+ (r +
σ2
2
)T
)]
. (42)
For the multi-keyword single-click option, the hedging delta of each keyword can
be computed by the Monte Carlo method, i.e., ∂V/∂Ci = EQ[∂V (T,C(T ))/∂Ci(T )]. To
examine the arbitrage, we compare the risk-less bank investment return to the actual
advertising strategy investment return.
Table II presents the overall results of our arbitrage test under the GBM, in which
the continuous compounded risk-less bank interest rate r = 5% (equivalent to r˜ =
4.12% per 31 days return3). We generate 100 simulated paths for each keyword and
examine the options using delta hedging. Let r̂ be the return of advertising strategy
over 31 days. The arbitrage detection criteria is
r̂ ≤ |r˜ ± ε| ? arb doesn’t exist : arb exists, (43)
3The relationship between the continuous compounding r and the return per 31 days r˜ is: 1+ r˜ = er×30/365.
For detail information, please refer to Hull (sec 4.2 [Hull 2009]).
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Fig. 3. Empirical example of the arbitrage analysis under GBM dynamic for the US market.
where the notation ε is the model variation threshold (where we set ε = 5% in our
experiments). We define the identified arbitrage α as the excess return between r̂ and
|r˜ ± ε|. Therefore, if arbitrage exists, we have
α =
{
r̂ − (r˜ + ε), if r̂ ≥ r˜ + ε,
r̂ − (r˜ − ε), if r̂ ≤ r˜ − ε, (44)
where a positive α means that the advertiser who buys an option can obtain guar-
anteed profits while the negative α indicates the case of making profits by selling an
option. As shown in Table II, there are 99.76% (1-keyword), 93.06% (2-keyword) and
92.71% (3-keyword) options fairly priced if GBM is valid. Only a small number of op-
tions exhibits arbitrage and most of the mean arbitrage values lie within 5%, such as
shown in Figure 3.
The existence of small arbitrage in our tests under the GBM dynamics may be due to
the following two reasons: (i) the stability of process simulations in both option pricing
and arbitrage test; (ii) the ad keywords are randomly selected for the 2 or 3-keyword
options, so a significant difference of keywords CPCs generates a large variation of
calculated option payoffs that triggers a certain arbitrage.
4.3. Model Validation and Robustness Test
We now investigate if the GBM assumptions are satisfied by all keywords and exam-
ine if there are and how many arbitrage exists in the priced options for non-GBM
keywords.
4.3.1. Checking the Underlying GBM Assumptions. There are two GBM assumptions that
need to be verified [Marathe and Ryan 2005]: (i) normality of change rates of log
† This manuscript is under submission to a journal.
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Fig. 4. Empirical example of the GBM assumptions checking for the keyword ‘insurance’, where the
Shapiro-Wilk test is with p-value 0.2144 and the Ljung-Box test is with p-value 0.6971.
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Fig. 5. Overview of the GBM assumptions checking for all ad keywords of experimental groups of both US
and UK markets.
CPCs; and (ii) independence from previous data. Normality can be either graph-
ically checked by histogram/Q-Q plot or statistically verified by the Shapiro-Wilk
test [Shapiro and Wilk 1965]. To examine independence, we employ the autocorre-
lation function (ACF) [Tsay 2005] and the Ljung-Box statistic [Ljung and Box 1978].
To illustrate the procedure, Figure 4 gives an example of the keyword ‘insurance’. Fig-
ure 4 (a)-(b) exhibit the movement of CPCs and log change rates while Figure 4 (c)-(d)
show that the stated two assumptions are satisfied in this case.
The GBM assumptions were checked for the training data of all ad keywords. As
shown in Figure 5, there are 14.25% and 17.20% of keywords in US and UK markets
that satisfy the GBM, respectively. Thus about 15.73% of keywords that can be ef-
fectively priced into an option contract under the assumption of GBM dynamics. It is
† This manuscript is under submission to a journal.
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Fig. 7. Overview of pricing model robust tests.
worth mentioning that not all keywords follow the GBM. We use the GBM dynamics
in our model mainly for the mathematical convenience; but nonetheless, we give our
investigation on the arbitrage opportunities under non-GMB dynamics in order to test
how robust of our pricing model is for non-GMB keywords.
4.3.2. Examining Arbitrage for Non-GBM Dynamics. We now test several popular stochas-
tic processes (together with the real data) to check the arbitrage from the options of
non-GBM keywords. Table III shows the candidate dynamics (the CEV, the MRD, the
CIR and HWV models). Each dynamic model represents a certain feature of time se-
ries data, such as mean-reverting, constant volatility and square root volatility [Hull
2009]. The arbitrage tests here are slightly different from that of GBM. We estimate
the dynamic parameters from the data in the test sets instead of the learning sets
and treat the real data as one single path of the dynamics. Therefore, the simulated
data has the same drift, volatility and correlations as the real test data. Since the sim-
ulation parameters are significantly different to the pricing parameters, we are able
to examine the arbitrage multiple times when the real-world environment does not
follow the GBM. Also for the candidate dynamics, several hypothesis tests have been
employed to check if the simulated path and real data come from a same distribution.
These tests include the Wilcoxon test [Wilcoxon 1945], Ansari-Bradley test [Mood et al.
1974] and Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [Justel et al. 1997]. Figure 6 summa-
rizes results of the dynamics’s fitness testing, where the y-axis represents the mean
percentage of simulated paths not rejected by the hypothesis tests. Even though the
three tests give different absolute percentages, the dynamics’ performance is similar,
† This manuscript is under submission to a journal.
:18 B. Chen et al.
i.e. the CEV model has the best simulations of the real data, followed by the MRD
model. The CIR and HWV models are very close.
Table IV presents the arbitrage testing results for non-GBM dynamics, where most
of experimental groups exhibit arbitrage. The CEV model gives the best no-arbitrage
performance, showing that 78.65% of CEV-based keywords can be fairly priced by us-
ing the GBM-based option pricing model. About 53.05% of CIR and about 43% of MRD
or HWV based options have no arbitrage. For single-keyword options, the fairness per-
centage is more than 85% across all groups. However, this figure drops to around 38%
for multi-keyword options (36.27% for 2-keyword options and 42% for 3-keyword op-
tions). For the identified arbitrage, many groups (especially single-keyword options)
show small arbitrage values around 10% while arbitrage explodes in some groups.
In summary, Tables II and IV have illustrated that our option pricing model is effec-
tive and robust for the real sponsored search data. As in Figure 7, when the keywords
satisfy the GBM (15.73%), the pricing model ensures that 95.17% options are fairly
priced under 5% arbitrage precision. For the non-GBM keywords, the best CEV model
gives 78.65% fairness while the worst CIR model is with 31.97%. Overall, the best ex-
pected fairness of option pricing for all keywords is 81.25% while the worst is 41.91%.
Also, the increase of the number of ad keywords in an ad option increases the like-
lihood of arbitrage. This is confirmed by the fact that expected fairness drops from
86.83% (99.76% GBM and 83.60% non-GBM for single-keyword options) to 43.69% (2-
keyword options) and 53.39% (3-keyword options), respectively.
4.4. Effects of Ad Options to Search Engine
We continue the discussion from Section 3.2 and investigate the effects of ad options
on the search engine’s revenue.
Let’s start with the case of single-keyword options. The example of keyword ‘eq-
uity loans’ in Figure 8(a) illustrates (other keywords exhibit the similar pattern) the
conclusions from our theoretical analysis in Section 3.2 that (i) the revenue differ-
ence between option and auction is always positive and (ii) that when the fixed CPC
F = EQt [C(T )] = 4.5022, the revenue difference D(F ) achieves its maximum (the cor-
responding option price pi = 0.1088) and the two boundary values are approximately
zero.
We further examine non-GBM cases. Figure 8(b)-(e) shows that when the fixed CPC
is close to zero, the revenue difference D(F ) → 0. This is because when the fixed CPC
approximates zero, it is almost certain that the option will be used in the contract
period. As such, the only income for the keyword is from the option price, which in
this case is close to the CPC in the auction market (discounted back to t=0). On the
other hand, if the fixed CPC is very high, it is almost certain that the option won’t be
used. In this case, the option price pi → 0 and the probability of exercising the option
P(EQt [C(T )] ≥ F ) → 0. Hence, D(F ) would be zero. However, under the non-GBM
dynamics, the point F = EQt [C(T )] is not the optimal value that gives the maximum
D(F ), which indicates that arbitrage may occur.
† This manuscript is under submission to a journal.
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Fig. 8. Empirical example of search engine’s revenue for the keyword ‘equity loans’.
Next, Figure 9 illustrates the case where we have 2 candidate keywords: ‘iphone4’
and ‘dar martens’, where r = 5% and ρ = 0.0259. In Figure 9(a), we see that the
higher the fixed CPCs the lower is the option price. This property is the same as for
the single-keyword options. Also, the calculated option price achieves maximum when
all the fixed CPCs are zeros. Figure 9(b) then shows the revenue difference curve of
the search engine, where the red star represents the value when F1 = EQt [C1(T )] and
F2 = EQt [C2(T )]. The expected revenue differences are all above zero, showing that
this 2-keyword ad option is beneficial to the search engine’s revenue. However, an
interesting point to discuss is that the red star point is not the maximum difference
revenue, which is different from single-keyword options. This may be due to the fact
that the underlying CPCs move in a correlated manner and the advertiser switches
his/her exercising from one to another. The revenues’ difference curve in Figure 9(b)
is very smooth while Figure 10(b) shows a bit volatile pattern because the underlying
correlation increases. Above all, the properties of the revenue difference are similar to
those of single-keyword options and they are all positive.
It would be impossible to graphically examine the revenue difference for higher di-
mensional ad options (i.e., n ≥ 3). However, based on the earlier discussions, we can
summarize two properties. First, there are boundary values of the revenue differences.
If every Fi → 0, D(F) → 0; if every Fi → ∞, D(F) → 0. Second, there exists a maxi-
mum revenue difference value even though this may not at the point Fi = EQt [Ci(T )].
Overall, we are able to say that a proper setting of fixed CPCs by a search engine can
increase the ad revenue compared to keyword auctions.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we proposed a new ad selling mechanism for sponsored search that bene-
fits both advertisers and search engine. On the one hand, advertisers are able to secure
† This manuscript is under submission to a journal.
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Fig. 9. Empirical example of option pricing and search engine’s revenue for the keywords ‘iphone4’ and ‘dr
martens’, where ρ = 0.0259.
Fig. 10. Empirical example of option pricing and search engine’s revenue for the keywords ‘non profit debt
consolidation’ and ‘canon 5d’, where ρ = 0.2247.
ad service delivery in the future and can be released from auction campaigns, thereby
reducing uncertainty in the cost of a campaign. On the other hand, a search engine
benefits by (i) being able to sell the inventory of ad slots in advance and (ii) generating
a more stable and predictable revenue over a long-term period. The search engine may
also increase customer (advertisers) loyalty through contractual relationships, which
has the potential to improve revenue further. Thus, we believe the proposed ad option
contract is a good complement to keyword auctions for sponsored search.
There are three major limitations of our ad option framework. First, like all meth-
ods based on the GBM [Samuelson 1973; Marathe and Ryan 2005], the price move-
ment of the underlying ad keywords may not follow GBM dynamics. Some time series
features, such as price jumps and volatility clustering, cannot be captured effectively.
However, as the first ad option framework, our experimental results have shown that
the GBM assumption is reasonably robust to deviations from this assumption. Second,
other model assumptions, such as infinitely divisible clicks, continuous-time perfect
delta hedging, constant bank interest rate etc, are borrowed from the perfect market
settings in economics [Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 1973], but some of these as-
sumptions may not be valid in a real-world sponsored search environment. Third, we
did not explicitly cover the modelling of the supply and demand into the framework;
† This manuscript is under submission to a journal.
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our economic objective in this paper has been focused on reducing the risk of price
movements and defining the “fair” price in that regard. One can certainly look at the
problem from other perspectives; for instance, regarding the pricing as an optimisation
problem based on the supply and demand and their impact on the prices [Gallego and
Van Ryzin 1994].
Our work leaves several directions for future research. A stochastic process tailored
to some specific ad keywords is worth studying (e.g., jump-diffusion models and volatil-
ity models). Also, dynamically pricing and allocating ad options (with considering the
market changes) may further consolidate our work as we didn’t discuss how to manip-
ulate the limited inventory in front of the uncertain demand [Gallego and Van Ryzin
1994]. In addition, to address the competitions among advertisers who have the simi-
lar campaign needs, pricing ad options based on a game-theoretic perspective may be
of interest.
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